February 5, 2026, marked a pivotal moment in international relations, a date that will undoubtedly be etched into the annals of global security. On this day, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the final bilateral agreement limiting the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, officially expired. The very next day, the world witnessed another dramatic development: President Donald Trump decisively rejected Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to voluntarily continue observing these nuclear limits. This dual event has plunged the world into uncharted and potentially perilous waters, leaving, for the first time in over five decades, no legally binding restrictions on the two nations possessing the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons. [1, 2]
Signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, and entering into force on February 5, 2011, the New START Treaty represented a cornerstone of global strategic stability. Its primary objective was to enhance U.S. national security by placing verifiable limits on Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons and, reciprocally, on U.S. strategic offensive arms. [9]
The treaty established crucial aggregate limits on strategic offensive arms, aiming to reduce the risk of a nuclear arms race and improve predictability between the two nuclear superpowers. Specifically, New START capped:
- Deployed strategic nuclear warheads: 1,550 for each side.
- Deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments: 700 for each side.
- Deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers: 800 for each side.
Beyond these numerical restrictions, a vital component of New START was its robust verification regime. This included provisions for regular short-notice, on-site inspections and biannual data exchanges, which fostered transparency and built confidence between Washington and Moscow. [10, 9] These mechanisms provided invaluable insight into each other's nuclear forces, reducing the risk of strategic surprise, mistrust, and miscalculations. [9]
However, the treaty's implementation faced significant challenges in recent years. On-site inspections were halted in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and never fully resumed. [11, 12] More significantly, in February 2023, Russia suspended its participation in New START, citing U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine as making it impossible to allow inspections of its nuclear sites. [11, 12] While Russia stated it would continue to abide by the numerical limits, the suspension of inspections severely undermined the treaty's transparency provisions. [11, 12]
Anticipating the treaty's expiration, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in September 2025, proposed a pragmatic, albeit temporary, solution. He offered for both the United States and Russia to voluntarily adhere to the existing New START limits for an additional year, providing a window for negotiations on a successor agreement. [4, 8] Initially, President Trump's administration reportedly reacted positively to this proposal. [10, 13] White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt even publicly stated the proposal "sounded pretty good" in September 2025. [13]
However, this initial positive reception did not translate into an agreement. As February 5, 2026, dawned, marking the official end of New START, President Trump delivered his definitive rejection of Putin's proposal. In a post on his social media platform, Truth Social, Trump articulated his stance, stating: "Rather than extend 'NEW START' (A badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated), we should have our Nuclear Experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future."
Trump's criticisms of the treaty were multifaceted. He labeled it a "badly negotiated deal" and asserted that Russia had "grossly violated it," specifically pointing to Russia's 2023 decision to cease mutual inspections at nuclear facilities as a key grievance. This echoes a long-standing skepticism from Trump regarding arms control agreements, a sentiment evident in his 2019 withdrawal of the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, also citing Russian violations. [15, 16]
President Trump's rejection of a simple extension reflects a broader strategic vision for nuclear arms control – one that significantly departs from the bilateral framework that has defined U.S.-Russia relations for decades. A central tenet of this vision is the inclusion of China in any future arms control discussions. Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire for a trilateral agreement, arguing that China's rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal cannot be ignored in contemporary arms control efforts. [1, 14]
However, this aspiration faces considerable hurdles. China has consistently shown little to no interest in joining such negotiations, maintaining that its nuclear forces are dwarfed by those of the United States and Russia. [17] This reluctance adds a layer of complexity to Trump's proposed "new, improved, and modernized Treaty." The transactional, personalized showmanship that has often characterized Trump's diplomatic approach may prove ill-suited for the highly complex, patient, and disciplined negotiations required to forge viable arms control agreements involving multiple nuclear powers. [17]
While Trump has emphasized the need for a stronger American military and has highlighted defense upgrades during his presidency, including what he described as new and refurbished nuclear weapons, his statements on nuclear weapons have also shown some nuance. In February 2025, he reportedly stated, "There's no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons. We already have so many... You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over." [19] Yet, his ultimate decision regarding New START signals a preference for starting anew rather than maintaining existing limitations.
The immediate consequence of New START's expiry and Trump's rejection is clear: for the first time since the early 1970s, there are no legally binding limits on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia. This absence of constraints carries profound implications for global security and stability.
Perhaps the most pressing concern is the heightened risk of a new nuclear arms race. Experts and policymakers alike have warned that without agreed-upon limits, both nations could feel compelled to expand their strategic nuclear arsenals, leading to a dangerous and costly competition. [4, 17] Russia's Deputy Chair of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, ominously warned the U.S. that “winter is coming” following the treaty's expiry, highlighting the perceived shift in the strategic landscape. [1]
New START's verification measures were crucial for transparency and predictability. With their cessation, knowledge gaps regarding Russian and U.S. nuclear weapon numbers, operational status, and force posture will inevitably widen. [17, 9] This reduction in transparency increases the risk of strategic surprise, mistrust, and miscalculation, particularly in an environment already strained by geopolitical tensions and a worrying lack of diplomatic communication channels. [17, 9]
The demise of New START also sends a concerning signal to the global community regarding nuclear non-proliferation. When the two largest nuclear powers demonstrate a weakening commitment to arms control, it can undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and potentially encourage other states to pursue or expand their own nuclear capabilities. [17, 13]
Despite decades of arms reduction efforts since the Cold War, the world's nuclear arsenals remain substantial. As of the beginning of 2026, nine countries possessed roughly 12,321 nuclear warheads. The United States and Russia alone account for approximately 86% of this total inventory. [20]
Here's a snapshot of the estimated nuclear warhead inventories of the United States and Russia:
| Country |
Total Nuclear Warheads (Estimated Early 2026) |
Deployed Strategic Warheads (New START limits) |
| Russia |
~5,459 |
1,550 (treaty limit) |
| United States |
~5,177 |
1,550 (treaty limit) [1, 10] |
Note: The 'Total Nuclear Warheads' figure includes deployed, non-deployed, and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. The 'Deployed Strategic Warheads' figure refers to the limits under the now-expired New START Treaty.
While both countries had adhered to the deployed strategic warhead limits under New START, the total inventory figures highlight the immense destructive power at their disposal, even outside the treaty's scope.
The expiration of New START and President Trump's rejection of a temporary extension have created a vacuum in bilateral nuclear arms control. The path forward is fraught with challenges, but also holds the potential for a reimagined approach to managing nuclear risks.
Russian officials, while expressing regret over the treaty's end, have stated that Russia will continue to behave responsibly with its nuclear weapons and be guided by national interests. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov indicated that Moscow remains open to dialogue if constructive responses are received. [1, 5] However, the Russian Foreign Ministry has also warned that Moscow is ready to take "decisive military-technical measures" to counter potential threats. [11]
For the United States, the immediate priority is to define what a "new, improved, and modernized Treaty" would entail. The complexities of bringing China into a trilateral framework are immense, given Beijing's historical reluctance and the vast disparity in arsenal sizes. Moreover, negotiating a comprehensive new agreement will require sustained diplomatic effort over many months, if not years. [18]
Experts from institutions like SIPRI highlight the profound implications for European security, noting that a successor treaty was expected to cover tactical nuclear weapons, which pose a significant threat to the continent. Without arms control, the role of artificial intelligence and other new technologies could add further complexity and unpredictability to escalation dynamics. [17]
The expiry of the New START Treaty and President Trump's rejection of an immediate extension mark a significant departure from decades of established nuclear arms control. The world finds itself in an unsettling new era where the two most potent nuclear powers operate without formal, legally binding constraints on their strategic arsenals. This situation carries inherent risks, including the potential for a new arms race, decreased transparency, and an elevated specter of miscalculation.
While President Trump's call for a "new, improved, and modernized Treaty" may stem from a desire for a more comprehensive and perhaps trilateral approach, the immediate absence of any framework demands urgent and responsible statesmanship. The lessons of the Cold War, where arms control treaties played a crucial role in preventing catastrophic conflict, must not be forgotten. The imperative now is for Washington and Moscow, along with other nuclear powers, to re-engage in serious, patient, and pragmatic dialogue to establish new mechanisms that ensure transparency, predictability, and ultimately, safeguard global peace and security in this increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.
- geo.tv
- economictimes.com
- publictv.in
- theguardian.com
- washingtonpost.com
- wikipedia.org
- chathamhouse.org
- trtworld.com
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